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JUrgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: COnlributions 10 a Dis-
course Theory of Law and Democracy, translated by William Rehg. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 1996. 
JOrgen Habermas's lifelong work has focused on the problem of cur-
tailed communication. In the best tradition of critical theory, he has set 
out to explicate the conditions that would need to be met to assure that 
persons could come together freely to negotiate about and decide upon 
the conditions of their existence collectively. Ideally, only the weight of 
the better argument would rule the day. If such were the case, presum-
ably the oppressive social structures of tradition, power, status, sexism, 
racism , political influence, etc. that distort free communication could 
be eliminated, thereby contributing to the emancipatory project of 
critical theory. But many are dissatisfied with Habermas's "linguistic 
turn," as Habermas's emphasis on the transcendental grounds of reason 
appears overly abstract and rar removed rrom praxis or the promise or 
practical application. In the book under review, Habermas takes up a 
particularly troublesome practical domain for his theory: law. 
Habermas argues that a "colonization of the lifeworld" occurs in mod-
ernity as impersonal media, money, and power infiltrate the lifeworld 
and distort the communicative practices of persons in their everyday 
face-to-face interactions. Functional integration, guided primarily by 
instrumental and technical rationality of the administrative realm, is a 
fundamental but problematic reality in modern societies as specialized 
structures arise to manage increasing societal complexity (i.e., via 
structural differentiation). In this way, Habermas's concern with the 
"pathologies of modernity" carries on the critical tradition of the sub-
stantive social inquiries initiated by Marx, Weber, and even Durkheim. 
Up through his Communicative Action period, Habermas's view of the 
role of law was ambivalent at best. Habermas conceded that across 
Western society, common and civil law had functioned as tools of 
emancipation as the principle of democratic self-government arose to 
combat earlier autocratic and monarchical forms of government. But 
after this initial emancipatory thrust, whereby common law and civil 
democracy came together to ensure rights for all citizens, Habermas 
noted that law attains greater and greater prominence in modern 
society primarily out of the need to establish some objective way of 
adjudicating conflict between members of an increasingly disparate 
citizenry. Law in effect becomes a "micro-manager" of people's every-
day lives, and this formalization or textualization of everyday life 
replaces the social solidarity of the lifeworld that formerly was forged 
tacitly through uncodified norms of communicative acts and reason. 
Habermas was especially concerned with the social-welfare state, be-
cause here we witness the creation of new and greater pressures toward 
systems incursions into the lifeworld. For example, because a greater 
range of "rights" are identified (on the basis of race, gender, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, etc.), legal enforcement of these rights en-
croach further into the lifeworld, thereby individualizing legal claims. 
Additionally, social-welfare provisions are implemented and statutes 
are enforced bureaucratically through impersonal central organizations. 
Finally, social-welfare claims are settled under the auspices of civil law, 
with monetary compensation going to aggrieved parties (i.e., the con-
sumerist re-definition of civil life). (These points are an adumbration 
of a lengthier discussion found in Mathieu Deflem, "Introduction: Law 
in Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action," Philosophy and 
Social Criticism 20 (1994), 1-20.) 
In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas overcomes his earlier ambiv-
alent view of law by describing it as a social institution that arises out 
of the common will of a people who, before establishing themselves as 
legal consociates, are already a communication community held to-
gether by a linguistic bond. The linguistic bond is forged through 
communicative actions wherein interactants take yes/no positions on 
a range of issues involving validity claims of normative rightness, sub-
jective truthfulness, and objective (or propositional) truth. In other 
words, law is, at the systems or administrative level (through procedural 
deliberation and decisionmaking arrived at impartially), the instan-
tiation of the primordial condition of lifeworld actors who come to-
gether freely to regulate the conditions of their common life via the 
negotiation and establishment of informal norms and values (i.e., cul-
ture) (pp. 304-308). 
By assimilating law to his theory of communicative action in this way, 
Habermas is able also to show how law is both a "social fact" that 
draws upon the state's monopoly on power to compel citizens to align 
their conduct to the prescriptions of the law ("facticity"), and a self-
referential system that, because of its "facticity" in the eyes of the 
citizenry, can evoke respect for the law beyond sheer compliance ("val-
idity"). Habermas argues that guarantees of law, namely certainty and 
legitimacy, are simultaneously redeemed at the level of judicial decision-
making, which at the systems level is analogous to the communicative 
rationality of "mere" citizens rationally setting standards for the con-
ditions of their existence at the lifeworld level (pp.197-203). 
This move is controversial for a theorist coming out of the critical-
theory tradition, because Habermas seems to embrace normative theo-
ries of democracy that suggest values, and hence laws, are created out 
of a consensus of citizens coming together to decide their fate collec-
tively through representation. By contrast, critical theories of democ-
racy hold that values are created primarily by elites who, wielding 
enormous social and political power through ideological hegemony, 
control the substance of public deliberation and, hence, are able to 
pass into legislation laws that reflect and defend their own interests at 
the expense of the relatively powerless masses (pp. 315-387). 
Habermas attempts to walk a tightrope between these two extremes by 
creating a proceduralist theory of democracy that "invests the demo-
cratic process with normative connotations stronger than those found 
in the liberal model but weaker than those found in the republican 
model" (p.298). In other words, Habermas argues that the ultimate 
grounds of democracy must be founded not on the peculiar form that 
deliberations in the public sphere take, but on the unthematized insti-
tutionalization of procedures and conditions of communication that 
ultimately leads to thematized issues of democratic opinion- and will-
formation. 
This is an extremely abstract and complex argument that appears 
indefensible on the surface, and there is simply not enough space here 
to justify or clarify fully Habermas's position. In effect, Habermas 
wants to analyze the implementation of democratic procedures in 
modern societies without lapsing into the reifying tendencies of earlier 
theories that tend to view the creation and implementation of such 
procedures as emanating from above rather than through the concerted 
activities of real, flesh-and-blood human beings. As Bobbio states, "As 
soon as we conceive intentional social relations as communicatively 
mediated in the sense proposed, we are no longer dealing with disem-
bodied, omniscient beings who exist beyond the empirical realm and 
are capable of context-free action, so to speak" (p. 324). 
Actors are socialized into concrete forms of life, but they are not totally 
at the mercy of their lifeworld. Habermas's proceduralist view of de-
mocracy is derived from a discourse theory whose guiding principle 
states that "Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly 
affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourse" 
(p. 107). Within the contexts of their everyday lifeworId, actors take 
yes/no positions on various claims pertaining to propositional truth, 
normative rightness, and subjective truthfulness. The ability to say no 
in any of these instances marks the freedom that comes through per-
suasion rather than coercion. Although no complex society could ever 
fully implement this model of purely communicative social relations, 
Habermas argues that there is an underside to the realities of inequality 
and differential power that, although hidden from the participants 
themselves, nevertheless contains the presuppositions of communicative 
action and the tacit injunction of the discourse principle. Viewed in this 
light, "law as such already incorporates those features from which the 
model of 'pure' sociation abstracts" (p. 326). 
By insisting ultimately on the ontological priority of the discourse prin-
ciple, Habermas attempts to shatter once and for all the philosophy of 
consciousness program. The philosophy of consciousness, Habermas 
asserts, leads one either "to ascribe the citizens' practice of self-deter-
mination to a macrosocia1 subject or to refer the anonymous rule of 
law to competing individual subjects" (p. 29). Discourse theory instead 
"reckons with the higher-level intersubjectivity of processes of reaching 
understanding that take place through democratic procedures or in the 
communicative network of public spheres"(ibid.). 
Habermas envisions relatively subjectless communications that form 
arenas at both lifeworld and system levels in which rational opinion-
and will-formation can take place. This idea owes much to Parsons's 
conceptualization of the generalized media of interchange - such as 
money and power - that circulate throughout complex societies. Contra 
Foucault, Mills, and other critical theorists, Habermas does not view 
social life as a zero-sum game, but rather as a tableau of inflationary 
and deflationary trends that range from oppressive totalitarianism at 
one extreme to relatively free and open civil democracy at the other. 
Habermas's entire argument is summed up in the following passage: 
"Once one gives up the philosophy of the subject, one needs neither to 
concentrate sovereignty concretely in the people nor to banish it in 
anonymous constitutional structures and powers. The 'self' of the self-
organizing legal community disappears in the subjectless forms of 
communication that regulate the flow of discursive opinion- and will-
formation in such a way that their fallible results enjoy the presumption 
of being reasonable" (p. 301). 
The most important thing to note about Habermas's program is that 
his reliance (some would say over-reliance) on the force of rationality 
as realized through talk, and as institutionalized in societal and political 
communities, is constituted as Habermas's own self-conscious attempt 
to capture the essence of such procedures and practices in his own 
theory. In effect, Habermas is attempting to thematize much about 
law and democracy that heretofore has gone unthematized. The impor-
tant role of rationality and the discourse principle in Habermas's theory 
could be construed as evidence that such procedures and practices are 
indeed operating in the "real" world. At least this is Habermas's hope. 
One problem, however, with Habermas's new sympathetic reading of 
welfare-state law is that he appears to discard his earlier emphasis on the 
importance of maintaining distinctions among various forms of ration-
ality. These distinctions are, as we have seen, the unique forms of ration-
ality paralleling the validity claims associated with issues of aesthetics 
(subjective truthfulness), moral-practical concerns (normative right-
ness), and technical-instrumental actions (propositional truth). Haber-
mas seems to sidestep the fact that the basis of law as a design of 
human action is overwhelmingly grounded in the idea of instrumental 
or technical reason, insofar as law is narrowly circumscribed by eviden-
tiary procedure and is limited to adjudicating conflict on a case-by-case 
basis. Case law sets up precedents for the basic conception that any 
legal norm can be created or changed by a procedurally correct enact-
ment. This is certainly true, as Habermas appropriates this directly from 
Weber's idea of the rational-legal domination by law in modern society. 
But law is not a theory of society, and does not pretend to contain 
indicators or dimensions of knowledge or practice that are isomorphic 
with the empirical social world. There are huge gaps in law's under-
standing of the ontology of social action and social life. For example, 
the limited rationality of law (instrumental rationality) means that the 
"reasonable person" standard is seriously limited because it is assimi-
lated to technical or instrumental rationality, as is the "reasonable 
woman" standard that has recently become prominent in sexual harass-
ment litigation and law. 
If Habermas's reading of law is correct, and if the discourse principle 
represents a sound basis for understanding the processes of law and 
democratic opinion- and will-formation, then the ongoing textualiza-
tion of social life may be viewed unproblematically and simply as a 
logical derivative of the internal assumptions of democracy itself. If 
indeed all law abiding citizens are equal under the law, and if indeed all 
citizens should be able to participate broadly in society vis-a-vis the 
rights that inhere to all as ratified members of the constitutional state, 
then law should specify clearly and concretely the possible dimensions 
across which citizens' rights can be assured. This leads to an inexorable 
process within modern welfare states whereby persons' status sets - the 
sum total of positions we hold in society - are formally connected to the 
protections of the substantive law appropriate to that particular insti-
tutional sphere (family, economy, religion, polity, education). 
An application: Sexual harassment 
Consider the example of sexual harassment, or hate speech law. Today 
across business, government, and education, the assumption is made 
that because of the "alarming" rate of incidents of harassment - usually 
verbal - formal guidelines must be enacted to control or sanction those 
actions or utterances found to be offensive, inappropriate, derogatory, 
inflammatory, or otherwise damaging. What should be realized, how-
ever, is that codifying rules of behavior presupposes that the heretofore 
tacit, un articulated rules of conduct have somehow fallen into dis-
repair, and are no longer efficient mechanisms of social control. 
Here, there is an explicit move away from the Enlightenment ethos that 
posits a dualism of mind and body. It is plain that those attempting to 
codify guidelines meant to control certain so-called offensive utterances 
must also attempt to sell the notion that words can indeed hurt as much 
as sticks and stones. Such a rhetorical ploy - in this case, the attempt to 
equate mental with physical harm - is essential for the livelihood and 
continuing legitimacy of any text. The pressures toward the continuing 
textualization of life - such as codifying guidelines, procedural norms, 
or truths regarding offensive talk - is symptomatic of broader processes 
of institutionalization, an area Habermas seems less interested in, but 
that nevertheless has an impact on his theory of democracy. 
In reality, much of social life involves the battle over knowledge claims 
(as played out through the implicit validity claims underlying all speech, 
as Habermas rightly points out). Although we all share to some degree 
a common culture, we see great differentiation at the level of individual 
personality. This gives us the flavor of multiple meaning, and social life 
can thereby be seen as a plurality of actors negotiating the conditions 
of their existence. 
Institutions, on the other hand, are quasi-symbolic forms of under-
standing that, even in the face of multiple meaning and polysymbolic 
interpretation, survive by ordering taken-for-granted knowledge of 
the essential segments of human activity. Institutions legitimate and 
reaffirm their existence by producing official texts; these texts provide a 
monologic interpretation of a particular area of social life. 
Unfortunately, the attempt to sanction through texts the institutional 
position as the singular objective truth goes beyond merely providing 
for a symbolic understanding of that area of social life. Texts work to 
"freeze" the world of everyday activity into an official, sanctioned ver-
sion of reality that is nothing more than a "textualization" of that 
reality. This closes off further understanding of that reality to members 
of the societal community. 
In summary, institutional pressures drive the legitimation of knowl-
edge claims. These knowledge claims must come in the form of "texts" 
that, as tracts of monologic discourse, serve to anchor its officially 
sanctioned version of reality in a secure, rational world of social facts. 
With this in mind, how did the texts containing recent legal decisions 
pertaining to sexual harassment. and especially the "reasonable woman" 
standard, come about, and is this explanation consistent with Haber-
mas's new sympathetic reading of welfare-state law? 
Very briefly, in a landmark 1991 case, the 9th U.S. Circuit Court in 
California ruled that sexual harassment law covers any remark or 
behavior that a "reasonable woman" would find to be a problem. The 
court also acknowledged that a woman's perception might differ from 
a man's (see Deborah L. Siegel, Sexual Harassment: Research and 
Resources, New York: National Council for Research on Women, 
1992). Judge Robert Beezer noted that "conduct that many men con-
sider unobjectionable may offend women," and that because women 
are more likely to be the victims of a sexual assault, they have "a 
stronger incentive to be concerned with sexual behavior." This ruling 
assumes, however, that there is a continuum that runs from the inno-
cent gesture to the brutish assault, all of which can be covered under 
the rubric of sexual harassment law, be it of the quid pro quo or "hostile 
environment" form. From some social-science perspectives, and espe-
cially from the perspective of Habermas's system/lifeworld distinction 
and the refinement of forms of rationality and validity claims operating 
in various social spheres, this is patently ridiculous. The attempt to 
capture this particular slice of social reality through formalization re-
flects not only law's tendency toward arbitrariness, but also the huge 
holes that exist in law's ability to make sense of the world, guided as it 
is by narrow understandings of the world as manifested in its employ-
ment of technical or instrumental rationality. In this sense, law may be 
understood as a system imperative intruding upon lifeworld activity, 
and the ongoing textualization of social life indeed may be considered 
an element in the colonization of the lifeworld. 
A leading pathology of modernity, then, is the gradual infiltration of 
law into ever greater expanses of lifeworld activity. As informal under-
standings of life give way to formal rules codified in law, the lifeworld 
becomes increasingly impoverished. As I see it, Habermas went too far 
in attempting to show that, no matter how bad things seem to be 
getting, citizens living in post-conventional societies (i.e., in constitu-
tional democracies) still have the power to create conditions for their 
existence that all could agree upon form a valid and just form oflife (as 
per the discourse principle). But Habermas need not point to law as 
functioning only in a positive or beneficial direction. The great promise 
of Habermas's theory of communicative action is, and has been, to 
identify the structures and processes operating within democratic soci-
eties that might pose a threat to the democratic principles of justice 
and fairness for all. 
Even with what I perceive as his misplaced and over-vigorous defense 
of welfare-state law, Habermas's linguistic account of solidarity, namely 
the bonds that hold members of a democratically self-regulated life-
world together through a rationally motivated agreement to reach 
understanding, is still the best resource for understanding both the 
blessings and ills of modernity. 
Kansas Newman College James J. Chriss 
